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Abstract
This article argues against Benjamin Libet’s claim that
his experiment has shown that our actions are caused by
brain events which begin before we decide and before we
even think about the action. It clarifies what exactly should
be meant by the RP causing, initiating, or preparing an
action. It argues that Libet’s claim is incompatible with
strong libertarian free will. It shows why Libet’s experiment
does not support his claim and why the experiments by
Herrmann et al. and by Trevena & Miller provide evidence
against his claim. The empirical evidence is compatible
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with strong libertarian free will. Neither the readiness
potential (RP, Bereitschaftspotential) nor the lateralized
readiness potential (LRP) causes our actions.
Keywords: libertarian free will, Libet, neuroscience,
Bereitschaftspotential, readiness potential, mechanicism
1 Introduction
Although Benjamin Libet’s interpretation of his experiment con-
cerning free will has received much criticism1, many people still
believe that he has provided evidence for the claim that all our
actions have unconscious causes that begin before we even think
about the action. To this claim I refer as ‘Libet’s claim’. In
this article I want to show that the experiment does not even
provide evidence for the thesis that the actions investigated, let
alone all our actions, have preceding unconscious causes. The
‘readiness potential’ (RP) or ‘Bereitschaftspotential’, which Libet
claimed to cause the action, is not a cause of the action but only
what the name which its discoverers, Hans Helmut Kornhuber
and Lüder Deecke (1965; cf. Jahanshahi and Hallet 2003 and
Shibasaki and Hallett 2006), gave to it, and which is also used
as a German loneword in anglophone neuroscience, suggests: a
readiness potential (‘Bereitschaftspotential’). I shall proceed by
addressing the following points:
∙ Summarize Libet’s interpretation of his argument.
∙ What does it mean that a certain event ‘caused’ the action?
1Libet described the experiment in Libet et al. 1982 and Libet et al.
1983 and interpreted it further in Libet 1985 and Libet 1999. For criticism
see the ‘Open Peer Commentary’ in Libet 1985, pp. 539–566, the journal
Consciousness and Cognition volume 11, 2011, number 2, Sinnott-Armstrong
and Nadel 2011, Swinburne 2011, Deecke and Kornhuber 2003, Batthyany
2009. In what follows, publication years refer to Libet’s articles unless specified
otherwise.
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∙ Why does Libet’s claim contradict belief in free will?
∙ Libet’s defence of the claim that the RP causes the hand
movement
∙ New experiments showing that the RP does not cause the
hand movement
2 The popular interpretation of Libet’s experiment
(2.1) The popular picture, which Libet spread himself in his
articles about free will (for example in 1999), goes like this.
In his experiment Libet told some test persons to
move their hand when they wanted to, voluntarily,
spontaneously, ‘on her/his own initiative’. (1999, p. 47)
He wanted to know: ‘when does the conscious wish or
intention (to perform the act) appear?’ (1999, p. 49)
Therefore he gave the test persons a special clock
and asked them to report the time ‘at which he/she
was first aware of the wish or urge to act’. This first
awareness is referred to as ‘W’. Libet measured when
the muscle activity and when a certain brain activity,
the ‘readiness potential’, RP, began. The result was
that W begins 200 ms (milliseconds) before muscle
activity, and RP begins 350 ms before W. Therefore
‘the volitional process is [. . . ] initiated unconsciously’,
before the agent even thought about it. (1999, p. 47)
(2.2) I have shown elsewhere that this description of the ex-
periment is wrong and that Libet used the words ‘voluntary’
and ‘spontaneous’ misleadingly. In fact the test persons were not
told to move their hand ‘whenever they want to’, but, to the
contrary, they were told to move their hand only when an urge
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to do so arises. The hand movements investigated were more like
involuntary fits than like voluntary actions. If we have free will,
then these hand movements may well have unconscious preceding
causes, while actions of the kind that Libet did not investigate
do not have such causes. However, in the present article I put
this issue aside and investigate only whether Libet has provided
evidence for the claim that the RP causes the hand movement.
3 What does it mean that the RP ‘caused’ the
action?
(3.1) Libet claimed that the RP caused and initiated the actions
investigated and indeed all actions. Let us clarify what ‘causes’
here means. If somebody’s lighting a pipe caused an explosion in
a room with gas, then in some very general sense it is also true
that the presence of the gas before the occurrence of the spark
caused the explosion. But that is not the sense we need for ‘The
RP caused the action’, because in this sense it would even be
true that the hand’s existence five seconds before the movement
caused the movement.
(3.2) What is meant is that the RP, from its onset, is a part
of a complete, non-probabilistic cause of the movement, and that
the other parts alone could not have caused it. In the Hobbesian
tradition one would say that the RP is a part of a ‘sufficient’
cause, in the sense of a ‘necessitating’ cause. As in my view
(Wachter 2012) it is impossible that an event necessitates a later
one, I should look for a weaker interpretation: The process that
led to the movement was already under way at the time of the
RP, and the RP was a part of that process. For expressing this
we need, instead of the idea of necessitation, the idea of a process
heading towards a certain event. I say in this case that the state
of affairs (or ‘event’) which is a stage of the process is the basis of
5
a ‘tendency’ towards that later event, where ‘tendency’ does not
have the implication of being probabilistic. (Wachter 2009, ch.
5) With this terminology Libet’s claim that the RP caused the
action means that the RP, from its onset, was a part of a state of
affairs that was the basis of a tendency towards the movement.
The state of affairs did not necessitate the movement – although
the process was not probabilistic – because it was possible that
something would stop the process, as Libet recognized when he
affirmed the possibility of ‘vetoing’. (Libet 1985, § 4.1) The only
possibility how it might not have led to the movement was that
something stops it. It could not stop by itself, by chance.
(3.3) Libet claimed that the actions he investigated and indeed
all our actions are initiated by a RP.2 We best understand this
as an addition to the claim that the RP causes the action. It
entails the claim that the RP is a part of a complete cause of the
movement, and adds to it the claim that before the RP there was
no process heading towards the movement. With my terminology,
before the RP there was no state of a affairs that was the basis of
a tendency towards the movement. Without the initiating event,
things would have developed differently, the hand would not have
moved (if also nothing else caused a movement). The things or
states of affairs with which the RP cooperates to move the hand
2Libet’s claim that the RP ‘initiates’ the action is contained even in the
subtitle of his 1983 paper, ‘The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary
act’, and in the title of his 1985 paper, ‘Unconscious cerebral initiative and
the role of conscious will in voluntary action’. In 2003 he repeated this, saying
that his experiment ‘produced evidence that the brain appears to initiate a
freely voluntary act well before the subject is aware that he wishes or feels
the urge to act’. (p. 325) Still in Libet 2006 he claimed that ‘free will could
not initiate the volitional process’ (543) and that he had found out ‘that a
voluntary act is initiated unconsciously’ (546).
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are activated through the initiating event.3
(3.4) The claim that the RP caused the movements is relevant
for free will because the RP is unconscious. That means that the
person is not aware of the RP and that it is not linked with a
mental, conscious event. The RP begins before W and thus before
the any mental event that may be a cause of the action. Therefore
I express Libet’s claim that the action was caused or initiated
unconsciously also by saying that it was caused or initiated before
the person even thought about it.
(3.5) Finally, we need to need to spell out the alternative to
Libet’s claim that the RP caused the movement: that the RP
was, or was associated with, a preparation of a possible action,
or an expectation, or a state of readiness to act in one way or
another. This means: At the time of the onset of RP there
was no complete cause of the movement, there was no process
towards the movement under way. But later, when some further
event occurs, it (as well as some other states) became a part of a
complete cause of the movement.
4 Libet’s claim is incompatible with free will
(4.1) Libet’s claim that the hand movements which he investigated
were caused by the RP is compatible with free will, because other
actions, which differ from the actions he investigated, might not
have preceding unconscious causes. But as he alleges, and as
I accept only for the sake of the argument in this article, that
the actions he investigated were ‘voluntary’ and that thus if any
actions have no preceding unconscious causes, then these do, he
3If you do not want to hold that before the RP there was no process
towards the movement, because you believe that for any event there is at
any time before a process heading towards it, then you can make sense of
‘initiate’ by taking it to mean just that it activated certain things or states of
affairs to bring about the movement.
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derives from this his general claim that all our actions are initiated
unconsciously. Libet presented this claim as being incompatible
with or limiting free will. I believe that this is correct, but many
philosophers replied that it is compatible with free will.
(4.2) Compatibilists believe that an action’s being free is com-
patible with its being the result of a causal process and that the
reasons for an action (or the beliefs in them) is amongst its causes.
Therefore at least for some compatibilists, free will is compatible
with Libet’s experiment. Only some stronger, libertarian notions
of free will might be in conflict with Libet’s claim. Thus some
philosophers defend free will against the evidence from neuros-
cience by saying: ‘Only a very old-fashioned, mysterious kind of
free will is incompatible with Libet’s experiment. Nobody would
defend that nowadays.’ Alfred Mele for example, although he
calls his view libertarian, writes:
Only a certain kind of mind-body dualist would hold that
conscious intentions do not ‘arise as a result of brain activ-
ity’. And such dualist views are rarely advocated in con-
temporary philosophical publications on free will. (Mele
2006, p. 40)
(4.3) There are views which are sometimes called ‘libertarian’
but which nevertheless are compatible with Libet’s claims and
therefore are called ‘modest’ (Mele 2006, p. 10; Mele 1995, pp. 211–
221; Clarke 2000), ‘credible’ (Clarke 1993), or ‘non-mysterious’:
First, some hold that, additionally to having event causes (de-
terministic or indeterministic), actions are caused by agents by
so-called ‘agent causation’. (Chisholm 1976, p. 201, Clarke 1993,
Swinburne 1997, p. 231) Second, some hold that actions have
event causes but the process of deliberation must be indeterm-
inistic (Mele 1995). Third, some hold that the action itself must
be caused indeterministically (Balaguer 2009). Such views are
compatible with Libet’s claim because their defenders could say
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that the action is caused by the agent as well as by the RP, or
they could say that the RP is just an indeterministic cause of the
action because all brain processes are indeterministic.
(4.4) But there is a stronger view of free will, which is more
clearly in conflict with Libet’s claim. The claim that conscious
intentions do not ‘arise as a result of brain activity’ is not, as Mele
says, dualism. A dualist could hold this claim, saying that there
are causal processes going from the soul to the brain. But only
some dualists will hold this, and it is in my view not a solution
of the problem of free will. Rather, the claim that conscious
intentions do not ‘arise as a result of brain activity’ is the denial
of mechanicism, which is the view that every event, necessarily,
is the result of a causal process. Although for many centuries
many philosophers did not believe in mechanicism, today many
have so internalized the doctrines of Hobbes, Descartes, and Kant
that they cannot imagine that one can reject mechanicism.
(4.5) In order to illustrate that one need not believe in mechan-
icism and to show that Libet’s claim, as he rightly suggests, is in
conflict with free will, let me sketch my strong libertarian theory.
(Wachter 2003; Wachter 2009, ch. 7) In free actions the action
process (i. e. the process that leads to the intended result, e. g.
the movement) has a beginning at least a part of which has no
preceding cause, neither a deterministic nor an indeterministic
one, but its occurrence is due to the agent. It is an event that
has no preceding cause but is brought about directly by the agent.
I call such an event a choice event. Agents have the power to
make certain events pop up. Through this they can initiate causal
processes. (Therefore my view can be called the ‘pop up view’ or
the ‘initiation view’.) So there is a third way how an event can
come about, besides being the result of a deterministic process
and being the result of an indeterministic process. Choice events
are brought about by the agent in the light of reasons or following
inclinations, but reasons (or belief in reasons) and inclinations
9
are not event causes of the actions.
(4.6) Whether we call the agent the ‘cause’ of the choice event,
as the defenders of agent causation would say, or say that the
choice event was ‘uncaused’, as the defenders of noncausal theories
say (Ginet 2007), does not matter here. That is just a matter
of how the word ‘cause’ is ordinarily used and in how wide a
sense we want to use it. What matters for our discussion of the
neuroscientific data is that a choice event has no preceding event
and that the agent initiates a causal process. Therefore, if Libet’s
claim that ‘the volitional process is [. . . ] initiated unconsciously’
(1999, p. 47) were true for all our actions, then there would be
no strong libertarian free will.4
5 Libet’s defence of the claim that the RP causes
the movement
(5.1) In order to defend my claim that the RP does not cause the
hand movement – not even in the cases which Libet investigated,
let alone in all actions – I shall now describe some flaws in Libet’s
argument.5 Libet first conducted trials with three persons, ‘group
1’, and ‘after a few months’ (1982, p. 323), with three different
persons, ‘group 2’.6 With each test person Libet conducted series
of 40 trials each. Of each series he formed the averaged values
of RP detection. (1982, p. 324) The test persons were watching
a kind of clock with a ‘cathode ray oscilloscope’ (CRO) spot
4Other authors who claim that actions involve events that have no preceding
cause are Ginet (2007), Lowe (2008, p. 12), and Meixner (2004, ch. 9).
5That the RP does not cause the movement has been argued by: Trevena
and Miller 2002, pp. 185, 187; Roskies 2011, 16 l (left column); Mele 2011,
p. 25 l; Pockett and Purdy 2011, p. 34 l.
6In the table with the measurement data (1983, p. 630) Libet omits one
person from group 1, M.B. The reason which he indicates is that ‘the quality
of the EEGs and the minimal amplitude of the RPs of one precluded using
much of her data.’ (1983, p. 624; 1982, p. 323)
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moving round. In the first trials each test person were instructed
‘to wait for one complete revolution of the CRO spot and then,
at any time thereafter when he felt like doing so, to perform the
quick, abrupt flexion of the fingers and/or the wrist of his right
hand’. The persons were asked to report the time, W, of their
first awareness of the urge.
(5.2) These instructions did not mention urges. But after
some trials, for ‘the latter half to two-thirds of sessions with
group 1’ (1982, p. 324; 1983, p. 625), a further instruction was
added: ‘let the urge to act [move their hand] appear on its own
at any time without any preplanning or concentration on when
to act’. (1982, p. 324) (Why did Libet not say exactly, when
this further instruction was introduced?) Libet does not tell us
why this instruction was added, but perhaps the reason was that
the results varied strongly, or perhaps there was no RP before
W. ‘After a small number’ (1982, p. 325) of series in group 1,
that is towards the end of the experiment with group 1, the test
persons were asked after each series ‘whether they were aware of
any pre-planning’. (1982, p. 325) (Why did Libet not say exactly,
when this question was introduced?) Apparently, in the trials in
which the test persons reported no preplanning the RP started
later.
(5.3) The results still varied strongly: ‘Under our conditions
RPs varied considerably in form and duration, even for a given
subject in the same session.’ (1982, p. 326). Libet distinguished
three types of averaged RPs, depending on their form and ‘the
time at which the main rise in negativity begins’. (1982, p. 326)
‘Type I RPs’ he called those averaged RPs which began more
than 700 msec before the hand movement. (‘In the more extreme
examples of type I [. . . ], which appeared [. . . ] before introducing
the instruction for “spontaneity”, the RP appeared to have be-
gun rising well before the –1400 msec of the available pre-event
recording time.’) ‘Type II RPs’ he called those averaged RPs
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which began 400 to 700 msec before the hand movement. ‘Type
III RPs’ he called those averaged RPs which began 200 to 350
msec before the hand movement.
(5.4) Libet presented as the result of his experiment that the
RP begins 550 ms before the movement while the first awareness
occurs at 350 ms before the movement. (1985, p. 529; 1999,
p. 47) For calculating these 550 ms he used only the results from
experiments with type II RPs. This raises questions. If one
obtains very different results when one conducts an experiment
several times, then it is of course wrong to distinguish three kinds
of results in order to use only one of these kinds for justifying
one’s conclusion. Is there a justification for omitting the type I
and the type III results? The only candidate for a justification
is the claim that only in the trials with type II RPs, and in all
these trials, there was no preplanning.
(5.5) Although the justification of Libet’s omitting the type I
and the type III results depends on this, the information about
in which trials the persons reported preplanning is difficult to
find in Libet’s articles and not entirely consistent. Let me quote
everything that Libet says about this:
1. The mode of questioning subjects about the state of pre-planning
[. . . ] could only provide limited indications about the relation of
these states to types of RPs, chiefly because it was impractical
to question the subject after each individual trial. (1982, p. 327)
[Why is that so? If the definition of ‘preplanning’ is sufficiently
clear at all, it should be easier for the test persons to say after
each trial whether there was preplanning than to say after 40
trials whether there was preplanning.]
2. ‘Pre-planning’ or ‘pre-intention’ in some form was reported by
the 3 subjects in group 2 and subjects S.S. and C.M. in group
1 in a total of 9 series. In 8 of these 9 series the RP was a type
I (the exception was a type II, in subject B.D.). The subjective
contents of these recalled awarenesses contained some important
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features. Subjects reported being aware of some ‘preplanning’
in only a minority of the 40 self-initiated acts that occurred in
the series for that averaged RP. The subjective recollection was
most often one of having a general intention or anticipation of
performing the act during a forthcoming period of time, when
the moving CRO spot would have entered a specific portion of
its revolving circle. (1982, p. 328)
3. For the 14 series with such reports [of no pre-planning for any of
the 40 acts in the series], essentially none of the RPs were type I
(one of these RPs was regarded as borderline I-II), while 9 were
type II and 4 type III. (1982, p. 329)
4. Self-initiated acts arising ‘spontaneously’, with no experience of
preparatory pre-planning or pre-intention to act, were associated
with type II RPs. (1982, p. 333)
5. Type II (and III) RPs are obtained when all 40 self-initiated
movements in the averaged series are reported by the subject
to have originated ‘spontaneously’ and ‘capriciously’, with no
recollections of preplanning experiences for any of the 40 events
in the series. Additional experiences of a ‘preplanning’ phase are
associated with type I RPs. (1983, p. 632)
6. All subjects reported that they could distinguish readily between
this awareness [W] and any experience of ‘preplanning’ that some-
times occurred in acts associated with type I RPs [. . . ]. Awareness
of ‘preplanning’ were completely absent in series associated with
type II (or III) RPs. (1983, p. 635)
7. Actual experiences of ‘preplanning’ were reported for only a
minority of self-initiated acts in series with type I RPs. [. . . ] In
series with type III RPs, all self-initiated acts were also spontan-
eous [by this Libet means without preplanning], as in type II.
(1983, p. 636)
8. A ‘preawareness’ that one is preparing to perform the voluntary
act, sometime within the next second or so, does in fact accom-
pany at least some of the events in those series that produce a
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type I RP, as noted above. [. . . ] In series giving type II RPs,
all of the self-initiated acts were described as ‘spontaneous’; the
subjects reported that each urge or wish to act appeared suddenly
‘out of nowhere’, with no specific preplanning or preawareness
that it was about to happen. (1983, p. 638)
(5.6) In none of Libet’s articles we find precise information
about how ‘preplanning’ was explained to the test persons, how
the questioning was conducted, and what the exact answers of the
test persons after which series were. The most precise information
is quotation 2 from 1982. Many researchers about free will do not
study this article, because they have no access to it or because
its thesis is not directly relevant for free will. The articles that
are studied more often (1983 and 1999), do not contain this
information. In 8 of all 9 series with preplanning, the RP was of
type I. Was in all series without preplanning the RP of type II
or III? Yes, nearly. According to quotation 3 (and in accordance
with quotation 7), of 14 series without preplanning, 9 had RPs
of type II, 4 had RPs of type III. (Libet considers here only the
trials with group 2, presumably because the majority of trials
with group 1 were without the instruction to avoid preplanning
and without the question about preplanning.) But why then does
quotation 4 say that preplanning is associated with type II RPs?
‘Associated’ here must mean that type II RPs occur always and
only in series without any preplanning. That would have to be
true if Libet’s leaving aside the type III RPs were to be justified.
But it follows from quotations 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 that it is not true:
in series without preplanning there are not only RPs of type II,
but also RPs of type III.
(5.7) Let us then look at the variation of the time of RP onset
in group 2 in all series without any preplanning, that is, (if we
trust Libet’s statements about where preplanning was reported)
in all series with RPs of type II or III. Here are the RP onset
times for the various test persons:
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∙ for S.B. between –900 and –550 msec;
∙ for G.L. between –800 msec and –500 msec;
∙ for B.D. between –650 and –225 msec.
The corresponding variation of the time difference between RP
onset and W:
∙ for S.B. between 439 and 755 msec;
∙ for G.L. between 500 and 800 msec;
∙ for B.D. between 80 and 504 msec.
So in some series the RP onset was measured just around one
tenth of a second before the report of the first awareness of the
urge. Given the difficulties in measuring W, the results leave open
the possibility that in some cases the RP started after W. The
reason for this need not be that the RP sometimes begins after
W, it could also be that the RP behaves very different in different
people or different cases, or that the experiment is imprecise.
(5.8) Perhaps we should even leave aside the difference between
trials with preplanning and trials without preplanning. Because it
is unclear what a preplanning before an urge should be, and surely
it is difficult to obtain exact information about the occurrence of
preplanning. Given that all test persons were instructed to move
their hand, all of them must have thought about the movement
in some way, and the boundary between trials with preplanning
and trials without is surely vague, and the different persons may
have treated it differently.7 If we leave aside the distinction
7Talmi and Frith 2011 note that the instructions are manipulative: ‘First,
the instructions convey a strong implicit message that the participant should
have an urge to move their finger during the course of the experiment, and
that they should have more than one such urge. Second, the instructions
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between trials with preplanning and trials without, the RP onset
is between –1400 msec and –225 msec, and the time difference
between RP onset and W is between 80 msec and 1129 msec.
(5.9) There is another reason why we should leave aside the
distinction between trials with preplanning and trials without: If,
as Libet claims, the RP initiated the action process in the cases
without preplanning, then it would surely do so also in the cases
with preplanning. Furthermore, Libet’s claim is that all actions
are initiated by RPs. That commits him to holding that also
the movements with preplanning are initiated by RPs. And if
Libet wants to leave aside the cases with preplanning, then he
has to assume that in those cases the RP does not initiate the
action, but, presumably (given that he does not want to accept
that the mind initiates the movement some time after RP), the
preplanning initiates the action. That would mean that, contrary
to Libet’s claim, a conscious event initiates the action.
(5.10) But even if we leave aside the series with type I RPs,
given that the series without any preplanning constitute a very
homogeneous set of trials, the variation is much bigger than
we should expect on the assumption that the RP causes the
movement. Because if the RP were the initiation of the action
process, then the time between the RP and the beginning of the
muscular activity should be always roughly the same, because
causal processes of the same type have the same velocity. As
sound travels always with the same speed through air, and the
time between a pin being pricked into your left toe and the
beginning of the pain is always the same, so should the causal
process from the initiation of the action process to the hand
movement always take the same time. Note that the numbers
convey the message that there is a particular temporal pattern of finger
movement that is “correct”. The participants were instructed to “let the urge
happen on its own at any time” implying that movements at some particular
time would not be right.’ (p. 128)
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which are given for the time of the RP onset are each already the
average of 40 movements. The real variation of the results may
therefore be even much bigger.
(5.11) What does the fact that in cases with preplanning the
RP starts earlier show? It arbitrates between the hypothesis
that the RP initiates the action, and the hypothesis that the RP
does not cause the action but is only a preparation for a possible
movement? On the assumption that the preplanning does not
cause the action and the RP does cause it, we should expect
that the time between the RP and the movement is the same
as in cases without preplanning. The preplanning might make
the urge and the movement occur earlier than they would occur
without the preplanning, but the preplanning would not lengthen
the time between RP (the initiation of the movement) and the
movement. But the assumption that the RP does not cause the
movement but is a general readiness to act, explains why in cases
with preplanning the RP begins earlier.
(5.12) I conclude that Libet’s claim that the RP initiates the
hand movement is false and that the RP is a state of preparation
for a possible movement. The presence of the RP may shorten the
time between the initiation of the movement and the movement.
But the RP, at least at the beginning, does not initiate the
process leading to the movement and it is not a part of that
process, because there is not yet such a process. It is like the
presence of the gas in a room before the explosion caused by
someone lighting his pipe: It exists already before the explosion
is initiated by the spark. Before the spark occurs, there is no
process, and the presence of the gas is neither a complete cause
of the explosion nor a part of it.
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6 Herrmann’s experiment shows that the RP does
not cause the movement
(6.1) One can improve our knowledge about the connections
between free actions, conscious events, and brain events by con-
ducting experiments which
1. let test persons act whenever they want to, rather than, as
in Libet’s experiment, just on an urge;
2. compare actions and omissions;
3. give a choice between different actions;
4. test not only choices of equal value but also cases where
one choice is believed to be better than the other, with our
without a counteracting temptation.
(6.2) Christoph Herrmann et al. (2005) conducted an experi-
ment with a choice between different actions. If the RP begins
before the choice is made, then the RP does not cause the action.
The test persons are instructed to press a certain button with
their left hand when they see a certain symbol on a screen, and
to press a button with their right hand when they see a certain
different symbol. This avoids all the imprecision and uncertainties
that are involved in the measurement of Libet’s event W. The
result is this:
‘Our results show that the neuronal activity that occurs
before the motor reactions begins already at a time when
the test persons can not know yet whether they shall press
the button with the left or with the right hand. Therefore
the observed activity cannot be considered to be a specific
preparation to press one of the two buttons.’ (Herrmann
et al. 2005, 128; my transl.)
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The authors therefore reject Libet’s claim that ‘the brain “de-
cides” to initiate or, at least, to prepare to initiate the act before
there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision
has taken place’ (Libet 1985, p. 536 l):
‘Because the RP begins before the signal and the test
persons react correctly, the RP cannot determine which of
the two available alternatives (movement of the right or
the left hand) will be executed. Instead the RP seems to
represent a general expectation.’ (Herrmann et al. 2005,
p. 130)
(6.3) This is correct. As we have seen above (§ 3), Libet’s claim
that the RP caused the action, means that the RP was a part of
a complete cause of the movement. If this were true, then already
at the time of the signal, a process would be under way towards
one of the two possible actions. We should therefore expect that
only 50 percent of the movements correspond to the signal. But
in fact the test persons react always correctly to the signal.
(6.4) It is too complicated to assume that always when the
signal occurs, there is already a process under way, and where
necessary the persons veto this process. There is no evidence
for the assumption that there are two kinds of cases, one with
vetoing, the other one where the process by chance is already
directed towards the correct movement. The test persons feel no
pressure or inclination to move one hand rather than the other.
The only motivation they have to move one hand rather than
the other is the signal. It is therefore much more probable that
the process towards one or the other movement begins after the
signal, when the test person has seen the signal and makes his
corresponding decision.
(6.5) I conclude that Herrmann et al. (2005) have provided
evidence for the the thesis that the readiness potential does not
cause the action but is only a state of preparation or expectation
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(as defined in § 3.5). It is not a complete cause of the movement,
but only a state of affairs that at a later time, after the signal,
when the choice occurs, becomes a part of a complete cause.
7 Trevena and Miller’s experiments
(7.1) Also the experiments by Trevena & Miller (2002 and 2010),
which implement some of the possible experiments that I men-
tioned in § 6.1, provide evidence for the thesis that the RP does
not cause the movement. The two experiments from 2002 are
designed to ‘replicate Libet et al.’s [1983] comparison of parti-
cipants’ movement-related brain activity with the reported times
of their decisions to move and also the reported times of their
decisions of which hand to move.’ They designed the experiment
more according to what Libet said than to what he did. For
example, they really instructed the test persons to move their
hand whenever they want to, as opposed to Libet, who frequently
wrote that he had told the test persons to move whenever they
want to, but who in fact had instructed them to move only when
an urge arises. The two experiments from 2010 compared ‘the
electrophysiological signs before a decision to move with signs
present before a decision not to move’. As there are two versions
of the second experiment from 2002 and two versions of the first
experiment from 2010, there are in total six experiments, which
use, in summary, the following instructions given to the test
persons:
1. Watch the screen, you will see an L or an R. A while after
the letter disappears, a clock with a moving dot will appear.
Then, at any time you want to, press the left key if it was an
L and press the right key if it was an R. Do so spontaneously,
as soon as you feel like it, rather than preplan the movement.
Note the position of the dot at the time of the decision to
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go now. (2002, pp. 172–177)
2. Put your two hands on these two keys and press at any
time one of them. Note the position of the dot at the time
of the decision to move now.
3. Put your two hands on these two keys and press at any time
one of them. Note the position of the dot at the time of
your decision of which hand to move. (2002, pp. 179–185)
4. Put your two hands on these two keys. At the start of each
trial you will see an L or R, indicating the hand to be used
on that trial. When you then after a while hear the tone,
tap the key with the required hand as quickly as possible.
5. Put your two hands on these two keys. ‘At the start of each
trial you will see an L or R, indicating the hand to be used
on that trial. However, you should only make a key-press
about half the time. Please try not to decide in advance
what you will do, but when you hear the tone either tap the
key with the required hand as quickly as possible, or make
no movement at all.’ (Trevena and Miller 2010, p. 449)
6. ‘When you hear the tone, please quickly tap with whichever
hand you feel like moving. Please try not to decide in
advance which hand you will use, just wait for the tone and
then decide.’ (Trevena and Miller 2010, p. 452)
Results
(7.2) In experiment 1, Trevena & Miller measure also another
brain event, the ‘Lateralized Readiness Potential’ (LRP):
‘The LRP measures the degree to which there is more
preparation to move one hand than the other, and
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it therefore seems to be a more specific measure of
motor preparation than the RP, which shows signs of
also reflecting a general anticipation of a forthcoming
voluntary movement. Clearly, then, a finding that
LRP onset preceded conscious decision making would
considerable strengthen Libet et al.’s (1983) conclusion
that brain processes involved in movement preparation
actually do precede the conscious decision to move.’
(2002, pp. 171–172)
The result of this experiment: ‘The main hand-specific prepara-
tion movement starts approximately 300 ms before the movement.’
The readiness potential (RP) ‘may be real[ly] starting as early
as 800 ms before the key press.’8 (2002, p. 175) Finally, ‘most
of the reported decision times were less than 400 ms before the
movement’. (2002, p. 177)
(7.3) The conclusion supported to some degree by these meas-
urements is that the RP starts before the conscious decision, and
the LRP starts after the conscious decision. The measurement of
the decision time is not very precise, because different persons
might call slightly different events the decision and because the
measurement is difficult. But that the LRP is measured to start
after the decision disconfirms Libet’s claim that our actions are
initiated unconsciously. It does so in the way in which your
searching for a cat in a room but not finding one disconfirms the
8Trevena & Miller note: ‘The onset time of –800 ms is much earlier than
the –500 ms reported previously [by Libet et al. 1983] for a RP before a
spontaneous voluntary movement. . . . Indeed, visual determination suggests a
value of –1300 ms in the present study, and this value is even more discrepant
from those reported previously [by Libet].’ (2002, p. 175) They do not realize
that Libet did not instruct the test persons to move whenever they want
to, but to wait for an urge. The difference in RP onset time is probably
connected with this difference. In an action out of an urge less preparation
in the brain is necessary.
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hypothesis that there are cats in the room. If we find that the
RP begins before the decision but is only a preparation, and that
the LRP does cause the movement but begins after the decision,
then we have searched the brain quite thoroughly for unconscious
causes of our decision and found that the best candidates are not
such causes.
(7.4) In experiments 2 and 3, ‘the RP was significantly negative
2000 ms before the movement. [. . . ] The onset of the LRP is
between 300 and 600 ms before the movement.’ (2002, p. 183)
‘The LRP begins earlier for the Hand-report condition [experiment
3] than for the When-report condition [experiment 2]’. (184) ‘The
earliest decision of when to move is at about –500 ms, whereas
the earliest reported decision of which hand to move is slightly
earlier, at about –650 ms.’ (184) So the LRP begins briefly before
or briefly after the conscious decision. That the hand-specific
LRP begins much later than the RP confirms my thesis that the
RP is not a cause of the action but just a preparation. At the
time of the RP the action process is not yet on its way. There is
at that time no event that is a stage of a causal process directed
towards the movement. This is also confirmed by the fact that
the RP starts so long before the movement, because it is unlikely
that there is such a long time between the initiation of the action
process and the beginning of muscular movement. It does not
take 2 seconds for a process to go from the brain to the muscle.9
(7.5) That the RP here begins so much earlier than in Libet’s
experiment, shows (although Trevena & Miller do not note this)
that in actions that are really voluntary the RP starts earlier
9This point is also a reason to doubt Soon et al.’s interpretation of their
experiment that ‘the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity
of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness’. (Soon
et al. 2008, p. 543) A further reason is that they could predict choices only
with less than 60 percent accuracy. For a critique of Soon et al. 2008 see
Batthyany 2009, pp. 151–156
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than in Libet’s pseudo-voluntary actions, i. e. movements initiated
by urges. This is in line with Libet’s observation that in trials
with preplanning the RP begins earlier than in trials without
preplanning. It confirms the hypothesis that in none of the cases
investigated the RP is a cause of the movement, but it is a
preparation, i. e. (as explained in § 3.5) an event that later, when
the initiating event occurs, becomes a part of the complete cause
of the movement. Before a voluntary action the brain gets ready
for the conscious decision. The mind tells the brain to get ready
because he is considering to make a decision to move. In the case
of an urge with preplanning, the preplanning makes the brain get
ready. In the case of an urge out of nowhere, without preplanning,
that kind of readiness begins later than in the case of an urge
with preplanning and later than in the case of a voluntary action,
because neither the mind nor an urge tells or causes the brain to
get ready.
(7.6) The result of experiments 4 and 5 was that the readiness
potential (EEG negativity) ‘was present more than 1 s before the
tone’ in all cases. (§ 2.2.2) Even in the cases where the person
decided not to move. It grows slowly and continuously until the
tone, then it increases sharply and briefly. (See figure 1 on p. 451.)
In experiment 5 ‘the amplitude of the preceding negativity did
not vary as a function of whether or not participants actually
made a hand movement after the tone.’10 In both experiments
‘movement-related lateralization [LRP] took place only after the
onset of the tone, and only when participants actually moved’.
(§ 2.2.3) The result of experiment 6 was that the RP began before
10The authors also conducted a variation of experiment 6 in which the
person was free to decide not to move, to move his left hand, or to move his
right hand. Also there the result was that in all cases the RP had the same
form. (See § 3.2.2.)
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the tone, but the LRP began after the onset of the tone.
(7.7) This confirms what I argued in my considerations about
Libet’s experiment and what Herrmann’s experiment has shown.
The RP does not cause the action, because it starts before the
onset of the tone, which is a part of the complete cause of the
action. Before the tone there is in the body no process towards
the movement.
(7.8) While the RP did not cause the movement, the LRP did.
It occurred in all and only those cases where there was movement,
and it started after the onset of the tone. But the evidence
suggests that it did not start before the conscious decision.
(7.9) Thus far I have investigated only whether the RP or the
LRP caused the action, i. e. whether the RP or the LRP from its
beginning were a part of a complete cause of the movement. The
remaining question is whether in the experiments with a tone
the RP or the LRP determine what the person will do when he
hears the tone. More precisely, that the RP determined what
the person will do when he hears the tone, means that the RP
together with states of affairs that obtained from its beginning
and together with the hearing of the tone constituted a complete
cause of the action. I abbreviate this by saying that the RP was
reaction determining. The LRP was a good candidate for being
reaction determining, but the experiments revealed that it always
begins after the tone. That the RP was not reaction determining
is proved by the fact that in experiment 5 the RP in the cases
where the persons moved had the same onset time and shape
as in the cases where they did not move, and by the fact that
in experiment 6 in the cases where the persons moved their left
hand the RP had the same onset time and shape as in the cases
where the persons moved their right hand.
(7.10) I conclude that the experiments by Trevena & Miller
constitute strong evidence for the claim that neither the RP nor
the LRP cause our actions before the conscious decision or before
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we even think about them and that neither the RP nor the LRP
are reaction determining. Trevena & Miller conclude rightly that
‘the outcome of the decision (whether to move or not) is not
related to the magnitude of either the negativity [the RP] or LRP
at the time of the decision.’ (§ 2.3)
8 Conclusion
Our question was whether the RP causes our actions before the
conscious decision or before we even think about them, in the
sense that the RP from its onset is a part of a complete cause
of the movement, i. e. a part of a process heading towards the
movement. Libet’s claim that the movements which he investig-
ated were caused by the RP is not supported by his experiment.
Therefore also his claim that in general our actions are caused
by unconscious brain events that precede our decisions is not
supported by his experiment. The experiments by Herrmann et
al. and by Trevena & Miller provide strong evidence for the thesis
that our movements are not caused by the readiness potential,
and some support for the claim that our actions are not caused
by preceding unconscious brain events, because the RP and the
LRP are good candidates for being causes of the actions, but
the RP has been found not to cause the actions, and the LRP
has been found to begin after the conscious decision. It is now
quite certain that the RP is what the name which its discoverers,
Hans Helmut Kornhuber and Lüder Deecke, gave to it already
in 1965 expresses: it is a ‘Bereitschaftspotential’, i. e. a readiness
potential; a state of readiness, and not the cause of the action
process. It is a part of a state of affairs that can later become a
part of the complete cause of a movement. The various experi-
ments are therefore compatible with strong libertarian free will,
and they have defeated the some possible empirical defeaters of
strong libertarian free will.
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The mechanicist belief that our actions are caused by un-
conscious preceding brain events will never die out. It is not
supported by empirical evidence, as John Eccles noted already
in his commentary in Libet 1985 (p. 543): ‘There is no scientific
basis for the belief that the introspective experience of initiating
a voluntary action is illusory.’ It may be supported by a priori
arguments or by wishful thinking. Maybe future findings will
support it, but the existing evidence makes that less probable, as
looking for but not finding cats in a room makes it less probable
that there are cats in that room. There was no want of criticism
of Libet’s claims already when it was published (see the open
peer commentary in Libet 1985, pp. 539–566), but nevertheless
the belief that he has provided evidence for the mechanicist be-
lief was spread widely. I hope that next time when somebody
makes unfounded claims to have found unconscious causes of our
actions, the scientific community will be able to communicate
more successfully what evidence there is.
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